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Abstract
When enough agents do not participate in asset markets, the slope
of the aggregate demand curve is reversed. Monetary policy should be
passive, to ensure equilibrium determinacy and to minimize variations in
output and inﬂation. This paper presents evidence that asset markets par-
ticipation in the US was limited over the Great Inﬂation period and the
slope of the IS curve had the ’wrong’ sign. Our results may help explain
the ’Great Inﬂation’ and give optimism for FED policy. If the economy
was characterized by a relatively higher degree of ﬁnancial frictions over
that period: (i) policy implied a determinate equilibrium and ruled out
sunspot ﬂuctuations; (ii) policy was closer to optimal than conventional
wisdom dictates; (iii) responses and variability of macroeconomic vari-
ables conditional upon fundamental shocks are close to their estimated
counterparts for a wide range of reasonable p ar am eteriz ations. N otably,
’cost-push’ shocks are enough to generate a Great Inﬂation.
Keywords: the Great Inﬂation; monetary policy rules; T
JEL C o d es: E31; E32, E44; E58; E65.
aylor Prin-
ciple; real (in)determinacy; limited asset markets participation.5
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Non-Technical Summary
The experience of the US economy over the 1970s is still a puzzle for the pro-
fession to a great extent. The exceptionally high and volatile inﬂation, coupled
with a few recessions, is generally considered to be the worst macroeconomic
performance that the US has experienced in the post-war era. This is even more
of a puzzle if one observes that the macroeconomic performance in terms of inﬂa-
tion and output growth in the 1950s and early 1960s was rather impressive. Due
to this exceptional character, this time span has come to be commonly known
as ’The Great Inﬂation’ period and is usually (although not only) associated
with Arthur Burns’ tenure as a Federal Reserve Chairman.
Many theories purported to explain these facts have been developed. Some
rely on the exceptionally bad luck (be it bad shocks, or simply not sophisti-
cated enough economics) being the cause of the exceptionally bad performance;
others blamed policymakers, namely the Federal Reserve (henceforth FED) di-
rectly. The latter stream accuses the FED of having been too accommodative to
pressures from either political parties or special interest groups. Others accuse
the FED of plain ignorance and having used a ’bad model ’. Yet others argue
that the FED was too accommodative and let non-fundamental beliefs about
higher inﬂation become self-fulﬁlling. The coming to oﬃce of Paul Volcker at the
end of the 1970s saw a substantial improvement in macroeconomic performance,
that has as a tendency been preserved throughout the subsequent period. Many
authors have argued that to understand the improved macroeconomic perfor-
mance one needs not look any further than at the change in policy. The coming
to oﬃce of Paul Volcker meant more aggressive (i.e. active) monetary policy,
which instead led to keeping inﬂation in check.
This paper introduces another piece purported to help solve this puzzle.
N a m e l y ,w ea r g u et h a tt h ed r a m a t i cc h a n g ei nﬁnancial markets that took place
around 1980, consisting in an unprecedented amount of ﬁnancial innovation and
deregulation and consequently an increase in ﬁnancial markets participation and
better consumption smoothing, is crucial to understanding macroeconomic per-
formance during the period under consideration. We present some evidence for
this change and for its testable implications on aggregate demand’s sensitivity
to real interest rates. Adding this piece to a standard model used for monetary
policy analysis, we are able to: (i) provide support for the passive monetary
policy before 1980 in terms of ruling out the possibility of non-fundamental,
belief-driven ﬂuctuations and minimizing inﬂation and output gap variability;
(ii) replicate qualitatively many stylized facts of the period, notably high and
volatile inﬂation, recessions, and higher overall macroeconomic volatility, that
can be driven exclusively by cost-push shocks.
Our story unfolds as follows. The 1970s were a period of especially high de-
gree of ﬁnancial market regulation, which discouraged saving and participation
in asset markets and triggered two responses around 1980 - from the legislators
(the Depository Institutions and Monetary Control Deregulation Act) and from
the ﬁnancial markets themselves (ﬁnancial innovation). In parallel and, we ar-
gue, not independently, behavior of the FED has changed (as described by an
interest rate rule) from a passive to an active policy, as documented widely in6
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the literature reviewed in the paper. Some recent theoretical contributions such
as Gali et al (2003) and Bilbiie (2003) suggest that in an economy with a high
share of agents not smoothing consumption, the properties of interest rate rules
are dramatically changed as compared to a standard economy whereby every-
body has unlimited access to asset markets. In Bilbiie (2003) we constructed
a standard sticky price model with limited asset markets participation, or ’seg-
mented markets’; some agents cannot trade assets as in Alvarez, Lucas and We-
ber (2002), and hence do not smooth consumption as in Mankiw (2000). First,
in such an economy the sensitivity of aggregate demand to interest rates changes
sign. We present evidence (from estimation of Euler Equations for output) that
this has been indeed the case in the US economy in the pre-Volcker sample.
Secondly, in such an economy a passive policy rule is not only consistent with
but also generically necessary for ruling out belief-induced ﬂuctuations. More-
over, a passive interest rate rule is the outcome of ’optimal’ monetary policy,
understood as minimizing inﬂation and output variability. These ﬁndings imply
that monetary policy in the 1970s might have been ’better’ than conventional
wisdom dictates. Armed with these ﬁndings we are able to study the dynamic
response of the model economy to fundamental shocks, something notoriously
impossible to do in a model with full participation, due to equilibrium indeter-
minacy when monetary policy is too accommodative ( ’passive’). Indeed, we
show that cost-push shocks can lead to higher and more volatile inﬂation and
to recessions in the model parameterized for the pre-Volcker period than in the
Volcker-Greenspan economy. Moreover, the predictions of the model are also
consistent with other empirical facts documented by others, as described in the
paper.
Our explanation for the Great Inﬂation squares with the view expressed by
Burns and other FED economists at the time (see Hetzel (1998) and Mayer
(1999)), as well as by many academics (e.g. Blinder (1982)). In our model,
inﬂation is a non-monetary phenomenon. While inﬂation can be caused by a
variety of shocks, we focus on cost-push shocks and show that they can pro-
duce a ’Great Inﬂation’ when asset markets participation is limited. The same
shocks cause output to fall below the natural rate, which is a feature of the
period under consideration. Expectations play a big role in determining the
equilibrium, as was also believed by Burns (see Hetzel (1998), Mayer (1999),
Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1999)). And the FED may have hated inﬂation
as much as it does nowadays (see Mayer (1999) for some evidence). But the
structure of the economy made it such that even a policy consistent with mini-
mizing macro variability and not subject to systematic biases resulted in greater
macroeconomic volatility.
A change in the structure of the ﬁnancial markets helps explain the change in
macroeconomic performance, along with the change in the policy response. The
tremendous ﬁnancial innovation and deregulation process in the 1979-1982 pe-
riod and the abnormally high degree of regulation in the 1970’s provide support
to this view. Moreover, it can be argued that such a change took place around
1980, at the same time when Paul Volcker came to oﬃce. The timing of the
policy and structural change may not be a mere coincidence; instead, the abrupt7
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change in the policy rule might be an optimal response to the structural change,
an hypothesis which is yet to be tested. Finally, we perform simulation exercises
for a parameterized (to US data) model economy incorporating the structural
change mentioned above. For key macro variales we calculate theoretical re-
sponses to cost-push and technology shocks and second moments (conditional
and unconditional); these match qualitatively what is found in many empirical
exercises.
Our focus on the change in asset markets participation does not imply that
we believe other stories do not contribute towards explaining the 1970s. We
merely argue that our explanation captures some features that other theories
by themselves do not. In that sense, our story could be part of the explanation,
together with other, complementary and consistent theories.8
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Arthur Burns (i) was ﬁercely opposed to inﬂation, as much as other FED chair-
men; (ii) thought inﬂation was a non-monetary phenomenon, and cost-push
shocks were causing the ’Great Inﬂation’ during his tenure at the FED; (iii) em-
phasized the importance of expectations of private agents for macroeconomic
outcomes1. Not least of all, Arthur Burns was, to the judgement of many, a great
economist2, with a deep understanding of business cycles. Yet it is widely docu-
mented that during the 1970s, inﬂation was high, persistent, and volatile, and a
few recessions hit the US economy. This paper adds one piece purported to help
s o l v et h i sm u c he x p l o r e dp u z z l e .N a m e l y ,w ea r g u et h a tt h ed r a m a t i cc h a n g ei n
ﬁnancial markets that took place around 1980, consisting in an unprecedented
amount of ﬁnancial innovation and deregulation and consequently an increase in
ﬁnancial markets participation and better consumption smoothing, is crucial to
understanding macroeconomic performance during the period under considera-
tion. We present some evidence for this change and for its testable implications
on aggregate demand’s sensitivity to real interest rates explained below. Adding
this piece to a standard model used for monetary policy analysis, we are able
to:
(i) provide support for the passive monetary policy before 1980 in terms of
ruling out sunspot ﬂuctuations and minimizing inﬂation and output gap vari-
ability.
(ii) replicate qualitatively many stylized facts of the period, notably high
and persistent inﬂation, recessions, and higher overall macroeconomic volatility.
This can be driven exclusively by cost-push shocks.
Our story unfolds as follows. The 1970s were a period of especially high de-
gree of ﬁnancial market regulation, which discouraged saving and participation
in asset markets and triggered two responses around 1980 - from the legislators
( t h eD I M C D A )a n df r o mt h eﬁnancial markets themselves (ﬁnancial innova-
tion). In parallel and, we argue, not independently, behavior of the FED has
changed (as described by an interest rate rule) from a passive to an active policy.
This is documented widely in the literature (i.a. CGG 2000, Taylor 1999, Lu-
bik and Schorfheide 2004). Some recent theoretical contributions suggest that
in an economy with a high share of agents not smoothing consumption, the
determinacy properties of interest rate rules are dramatically changed. Galí,
Lopez-Salido and Valles 2003b (henceforth GLV) argue that the Taylor princi-
ple is not a suﬃcient requirement anymore: the Central Bank needs to respond
much more aggressively to inﬂation and more so, the higher the share of ’rule-
of-thumb’ consumers. They also note that for a forward-looking rule only,t h e
Taylor principle may need to be violated. In Bilbiie (2003) we construct a stan-
dard sticky price model with limited asset markets participation (hereinafter:
LAMP) or ’segmented markets’; some agents cannot trade, as in e.g. Alvarez,
1Thorough evidence for these statements is presented in Hetzel 1998 and Mayer 1999.
2If professional recognition is any measure of that, it is worth mentioning that A. Burns
was head of the NBER since the 1940s, president of the American Economics Association,
and head of the Council of Economic Advisors under two administrations.9
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Lucas and Weber 2001, and hence do not smooth consumption as in Mankiw
2000 and GLV 2003b. First, in such an economy the sensitivity of aggregate
demand to interest rates changes sign. We present evidence (from estimation
of Euler Equations for output) that this has been indeed the case in the US
economy in the pre-Volcker sample. Secondly, a passive policy rule is not only
consistent with but also generically necessary for equilibrium uniqueness and
ruling out sunspot ﬂuctuations3. Moreover, a passive interest rate rule is also
the outcome of ’optimal’ monetary policy, understood as minimizing inﬂation
and output variability. These ﬁndings imply that monetary policy in the 1970s
might have been ’better’ than conventional wisdom dictates. Armed with these
results, we are able to study the dynamic response of the model economy to fun-
damental shocks, something impossible to do in a model with full participation
due to equilibrium indeterminacy when monetary policy is passive. We show
that cost-push shocks can lead to higher, more persistent and more volatile in-
ﬂation and to recessions in the model parameterized for the pre-Volcker period
than in the Volcker-Greenspan economy. Moreover, the eﬀects of technology
shocks are also qualitatively similar to those estimated by GLV (2003a).
Our explanation for the Great Inﬂation squares with the view expressed by
Burns and other FED economists at the time (see Hetzel (1998) and Mayer
(1999)), as well as by many academics (e.g. Blinder (1982)). In our model,
inﬂation is a non-monetary phenomenon. While inﬂation can be caused by a
variety of shocks, we focus on cost-push shocks and show that they can produce
a’ g r e a ti n ﬂation’ when asset markets participation is limited. The same shocks
cause output to fall below the natural rate, which is a feature of the period
under consideration. While other shocks undoubtedly contribute to macroeco-
nomic variability, Ireland (2004) ﬁnds a large role of cost push shock in the
pre-1980 period by performing variance decompositions in an estimated SDGE
model (similar results are found by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)). Expecta-
tions play a big role in determining the equilibrium, as was also believed by
Burns (see Hetzel (1998), Mayer (1999), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1999)).
And the FED may have hated inﬂa t i o na sm u c ha si td o e sn o w a d a y s( s e eM a y e r
(1999) for some evidence). But the structure of the economy made it such that
even a policy consistent with minimizing macro variability and not subject to
systematic biases resulted in greater macroeconomic volatility.
The explanation proposed here abstracts from a few aspects emphasized by
others: inﬂation bias; changing variance of shocks; information imperfections
(introduced later only in a crude way to show model is consistent with ’natural
rate misperceptions’ stories). This is not to say that we believe such aspects
have nothing to contribute towards explaining the 1970s. We merely argue that
our explanation captures some features that other theories by themselves do
not. In that sense, it could be part of the explanation, together with other,
complementary and consistent theories. What weighting should it receive in
solving the puzzle is of course an open issue.
3’Generically necessary ’ implies that this result is largely independent of whether current
or future inﬂation appear in the policy rule - see Bilbiie 2003 for details.10
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A ’good ’ theory purported to explain the Great inﬂation should perhaps
be consistent with a series of stylized facts for the 1970s (some uncontroversial,
some less so), among which:
1. high and persistent inﬂation, coupled with recessions.
2. high volatility of inﬂation and interest rates compared to the post-1980
period.
3. a change in the policy rule around 1980 (Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000),
Taylor (1999), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004))
4. a prominent role for cost-push shocks in driving ﬂuctuations (Burns’ own
view; Blinder (1982); Ireland (2004)).
5. non-standard eﬀects of technology shocks in pre-1980, standard after -
GLV (2003a).
6. higher inﬂation caused by policymakers’ misperceptions about natural rate
(Orphanides (2002)).
Bluntly, present views about what caused the Great Inﬂation can be divided
into:
1. Bad luck. Either larger shocks (Blinder (1982), Sargent (2002 )and ref-
erences therein, etc.), or ’honest mistake’ (Orphanides (2002), Collard
and Dellas (2003)). According to the latter view, Fed was overestimating
natural rate throughout the 1970s. However, this theory does not explain
why the 1950s and ﬁrst half of 1960s were marked by good macroeconomic
performance, nor why policy response changed in 1980.
2. Bad policy. A few frameworks blame policymakers directly for the poor
macroeconomic performance of the 1970s. Ireland (1999) emphasizes the
inﬂation bias but recognizes that this only implies a long-run tendency
to inﬂate and says nothing about short-term ﬂuctuations Other frame-
works postulate that the FED perceived an exploitable trade-oﬀ between
inﬂation and output or had too weak anti-inﬂationary preferences (this
is not consistent with evidence, and with Burns’ declarations as reported
by Mayer (1999) or Hetzel (1998)). DeLong (1997), Romer and Romer
(2002) argue that the FED were too averse towards recessions because of
the Great Depression leaving its mark - it is hard to explain why the US
did not have high inﬂation earlier, if so. The ’ignorance view ’ is also not
supported by data.
3. The last theories can be largely thought of as having in common the
emphasis on expectations and their role in determining the equilibrium
outcome. Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1999) emphasize ’expectations
traps’ and role for sunspot ﬂuctuations: inﬂationary policy, they argue,11
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was pursued because it is a self-fulﬁlling equilibrium feature of discre-
tionary policy. Finally, CGG (2000) instead argue that a passive policy
rule leaves room for sunspot ﬂuctuations, and such sunspot shocks led
to a higher level and variability of inﬂation. However, this approach has
three obvious shortcomings: (i) sunspot shocks increase both inﬂation and
output, something not seen in the data; (ii) in the theoretical model, one
cannot study the eﬀects of fundamental shocks when equilibrium is inde-
terminate; (iii) it is not clear why the FED would have followed a policy
that was suboptimal in the model?4
Our approach is most related to this third branch of literature. This litera-
ture (exempliﬁed by i.a. Taylor (1999) and CGG (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004)) uses theoretical developments on stability and optimality properties of
estimated interest rate rules to interpret the link between them and macroeco-
nomic performance during various historical episodes. Estimated policy rules
are appended to general equilibrium models to study the eﬀects of various fun-
damental shocks on, as well as variability of, macroeconomic variables. These
theoretical predictions can then be compared with results of empirical studies.
O n ei n s t a n c eo fs u c he x e r c i s ei sp r e c i s e l yt h es t u d yo ft h e’ Great Inﬂation’i nt h e
US in the 1970s. Researchers in the ﬁeld ﬁrst identiﬁed a change in monetary
policymaking with the coming to oﬃce of Paul Volcker as a chairman of the
FED in the US. Since macroeconomic performance (variability and responses of
macro variables to shocks) was also found to have changed, explaining the lat-
ter by the former (policy change) became the norm in the profession. Namely,
many authors have argued that policy before Volcker was ’badly’ conducted
along one or several dimensions, which led to worse macroeconomic performance
as compared to the Volcker-Greenspan era. One such argument relies upon
the estimated pre-Volcker policy rule not fulﬁlling the ’Taylor principle’, hence
containing the seeds of macroeconomic instability driven by non-fundamental
uncertainty (CGG (2000)).
We argue that FED policy might have been better managed than conven-
tional wisdom dictates, if such ﬁnancial market imperfections as the ones making
our theoretical results hold were pervasive during the ’Great Inﬂation’ period.
Most importantly, passive policy implies a determinate equilibrium and this
allows eﬀects of fundamental shocks to be studied. A change in ﬁnancial imper-
fections might help explain the change in macroeconomic performance, along
with the change in the policy response. The tremendous ﬁnancial innovation
and deregulation process in the 1979-1982 period and the abnormally high de-
gree of regulation in the 1970’s provide support to this view. Moreover, it can
be argued that such a change took place around 1980, same time as coming
to oﬃce of Paul Volcker. The timing of the policy and structural change may
not be a mere coincidence; instead, the abrupt change in the policy rule might
4Christiano and Gust (1999) address point (i) and show that in a limited participation
model a sunspot shock to inﬂationary expectations can decrease output. But the other prob-
lems still remain, let alone the diﬃculty with explaining what has triggered the sunspot shock,
what is its exact magnitude, and why is it located in inﬂation expectations.12
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be an optimal response to the structural change, an hypothesis which is yet
to be tested. Finally, we present theoretical responses to and second moments
of a parameterized (to US data) model economy to cost-push and technology
shocks, incorporating the structural change mentioned above; it turns out they
qualitatively match what is found in some empirical exercises.
2 Theoretical framework
In this section we brieﬂy outline the key features of a theory developed else-
where, whereby a passive monetary policy rule is consistent with (and indeed
required by) ’good policy’. GLV (2003b) is the ﬁrst study to tackle determinacy
properties of interest rate rules when some agents do not smooth consumption,
as mentioned in the Introduction. The exposition here uses the framework in
Bilbiie (2003). We choose this setup for three reasons. First, it emphasizes
the eﬀect of non-asset holders on aggregate demand, something absent in GLV
and which we wish to test empirically. Second, it derives analitically the ’In-
verted Taylor Principle’ as a generically necessary condition for both equilibrium
uniqueness and optimal policy when enough agents do not participate to asset
markets. Third, it is directly comparable with (and nests as a special case)
papers such as CGG (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), which interpret
the Great Inﬂation episode using estimated policy rules and comparing them to
prescriptions dictated by theoretical models.
The framework (outlined in detail in Bilbiie (2003)) is an extremely simple
dynamic sticky-price cashless general equilibrium model, similar to the work-
horse model in e.g. Woodford (2003, Ch 4) or Clarida et al (1999). The only
modiﬁcation to the standard framework is that we allow for limited asset mar-
kets participation, or segmented asset markets: part of the agents trade in
complete asset markets ancluding a market for shares in ﬁrms, while the other
agents do not trade any assets. The share of non-asset holders, say λ, is exoge-
nous, as in Alvarez, Lucas and Weber (2001) and Occhino (2003). These agents
will fail to smooth consumption, as in Mankiw (2000) or GLV (2003b), where
this failure comes from the failure to accumulate physical capital. Our model
does not feature capital accumulation, which allows us to obtain all results with
pencil and paper, and be transparent about the mechanism at work. Notably,
we boil down our model to two curves, as in the standard literature: a New
Philips Curve and an IS curve.
Under some assumption not central for the result5, it turns out that the New
Philips curve is not inﬂuenced by the presence of non-asset holders; inﬂation πt
5Namely, there is a ﬁxed cost for intermediate goods producers (and hence a degree of
increasing returns to scale in the sector) equal to the steady-state net markup, of the size
necessary to ensure proﬁts are zero in the long run (steady-state). This is consistent with
evidence in Rotemberg and Woodford 1995. Zero proﬁts in steady-state, in turn, imply that
steady-state consumption of the two types are equal since there is no capital income.13
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is related to its expected value and output gap xt by:





(1 − θ)(1− θβ)
θ
Real marginal costs and the output gap are not proportionally related, due
to the presence of the cost-push shocks ut, as in Clarida et al (1999). This can
represent variations in the price markups coming from time-varying elasticity of
substitution between intermediate goods (as in Ireland 2004), variations in wage
markups or other time-varying ineﬃciency wedges - see Woodford (2003, Ch 3)
for details. β is the discount factor, ϕs is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply for asset holders, µ is the steady-state net markup, and θ is the
probability that a ﬁrm cannot change its price in a given period in the Calvo
setup. xt denotes the deviations of output from its natural level under ﬂexible
prices and in the absence of other distortions, xt ≡ yt − y∗
t. Natural output is
a function of technology at (permanent shocks to technology have permanent











What changes, and is at the core of the ’Inverted Taylor Principle’ found in
Bilbiie (2003), is the IS curve relating output gap to its expected value and de-
viations of the expected real interest rate from the natural ’Wicksellian’ interest
rate:
IS : xt = Etxt+1 − δ
−1 [rt − Etπt+1 − r∗
t] (2)




It is clear that all modiﬁcation comes through the impact of the share of non-
asset holders λ and its interaction with the inverse elasticity of labor supply ϕs
on δ
−1, the sensitivity of aggregate demand to real interest rates. We will call
an economy in which δ<0 a limited asset markets participation economy, or
’LAMP economy’ for short. To end up in such an economy, the share of







This threshold is smaller, the more inelastic is labor supply. The intuition for this
result is simple6. The IS curve is obtained, as usually, from the Euler equation
for consumption. However, only consumption of asset holders obeys such an
equation. To ﬁnd an equation in output, one needs to express consumption
of asset holders as a function of total output. The two objects can be related
6For derivations and further intuition see Bilbiie 200314
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negatively due to the negative eﬀect of real wages (real marginal costs) on proﬁts
(and hence dividends). This negative link between wage and proﬁts is stronger,
the more inelastic labor supply is (the higher is ϕs), for an inelastic labor supply
implies low movements in output and hence in sales. Proﬁt variations, on the
other hand, become relatively more important in asset holders’ total income
as the relative share of non-asset holders increases (higher λ
1−λ)7.W h e nb o t h
these conditions are met (high ϕs and λ
1−λ) as in (3), asset holders’ consumption
decreases when output increases, since the increase in output is in that case
driven by a high increase in real wage, which implies a strong fall in proﬁts and
a fall in dividends dominating the real wage increase8.
Another way to put this is in labor market terminology: the equilibrium wage
hours locus, found by taking into account all equilibrium conditions, is less up-
ward sloping than the aggregate labor supply: for discussion and diagrammatic
representation see Bilbiie (2003). This modiﬁes drastically determinacy prop-
erties and optimal design of interest rate rules, and the economy’s response to
shocks. Finally, we can deﬁne the natural ’Wicksellian rate of interest r∗
t as the
level of the interest rate consistent with output being at its natural level (and










[Etat+1 − at] (4)
We assume that ∆at ≡ at−at−1, i sg i v e nb ya nA R (1) process ∆at = ρa∆at−1+
εa
t, which implies shocks to technology have permanent eﬀects (see Galí (1999),









such that the natural interest rate increases with technology shocks.
The model is closed by specifying monetary policy in terms of an interest
rate rule. We consider rules involving a response to expected inﬂation, as done
for example by CGG (2000). This speciﬁcation provides simpler determinacy
conditions, and captures the idea that the central bank responds to a larger set
of information than merely the current inﬂation rate:
rt = φπEtπt+1 + εt (5)
where εt is the non-systematic part of policy-induced variations in the nominal
rate.
2.1 The Inverted Taylor Principle and Optimal Passive
Monetary Policy
Determinacy properties of interest rate rules crucially depend on the presence of
non-asset holders, as has been ﬁrst noted by GLV (2003b). As the alert reader
7In the standard model all agents hold assets, so this mechanism is completely irrelevant.
Any increase in wage exactly compensates the decrease in dividends, since all output is con-
sumed by asset holders.
8Obviously, the mechanism relies upon real wage ﬂexibility. Introducing wage stickiness
w o u l dw e a k e nt h i sm e c h a n i s ma n dh e l pr e s t o r et h es t a n d a r dr e s u l t s .15
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will expect, in our framework this is due to the potential change in the sign of
t h es l o p eo ft h eI Sc u r v e .I n t u i t i v e l y ,n o t et h a tb yr e p l a c i n gt h eT a y l o rr u l ei n t o
the IS equation we obtain an ’aggregate demand’ curve (ignoring shocks):
xt − Etxt+1 = −δ
−1 (φπ − 1)Etπt+1
Determinacy properties hinge upon the sign of the slope of this curve, −δ
−1 (φπ − 1).
It is clear that when δ changes sign, a totally diﬀerent interest rate elasticity to
inﬂation is needed. Formally, one puts together equations (2) and (1), having
replaced (5) and looks at the eigenvalues of this dynamic system. Since both
inﬂation and output are forward-looking variables, both eigenvalues need to be
larger than one for equilibrium to be determinate. When this is not the case,
equilibrium is indeterminate, and sunspot shocks have real eﬀects. Proposition
1 in Bilbiie (2003) shows that with δ<0, an ’Inverted Taylor Principle’ holds:
a necessary condition for equilibrium determinacy (uniqueness) is9:
φπ < 1
Why does the Central Bank need to adopt a passive policy rule in order
to ensure equilibrium determinacy? In a LAMP economy (δ<0) aggregate
demand is no longer completely forward-looking, i.e. linked to demand of asset
holders. Suppose for simplicity and without losing generality that the sunspot
is located in inﬂationary expectations. A non-fundamental increase in expected
inﬂation causes a fall in the real interest rate. This leads to an increase in
consumption of asset holders, and an increase in the demand for goods; but
note that these are now partial eﬀects. Indeed, to work out the overall eﬀects
one needs to look at the component of aggregate demand coming from non-asset
holders and hence at the labor market. The partial eﬀects identiﬁed above would
cause an increase in the real wage (and a further boost to consumption of non-
asset holders) and a fall in hours. Increased demand, however, means that (i)
some ﬁrms adjust prices upwards, bringing about a further fall in the real rate
(as policy is passive); (ii) the rest of ﬁrms increase labor demand, due to sticky
prices. Note that the real rate will be falling along the entire adjustment path,
amplifying these eﬀects. But since this would translate into a high increase in
the real wage (and marginal cost) and a low increase in hours, it would lead to a
fall in proﬁts, and hence a negative income eﬀect on labor supply. The latter will
then not move, and no inﬂation will result, ruling out the eﬀects of sunspots.
This happens when asset markets participation is limited ’enough’ in a way
made explicit by (3). The reverse mental experiment can convince one that an
active policy rule would lead to sunspot equilibria in which non-fundamental
inﬂationary expectations become self-fulﬁlling.
In an economy characterized by a low degree of asset markets participation,
and hence by limited consumption smoothing, the central bank does well to
9For a full-ﬂedged determinacy discussion see Bilbiie (2003), where suﬃcient conditions are
also provided. We show that this result holds generically, i.e. for rules responding to current
inﬂation, as well as for rules responding to output gap under more restrictuve conditions. Gali
et al also study determinacy properties of interest rate rules based on numerical simulations
in the presence of capital, and do not emphasize the Inverted Taylor Principle.16
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adopt a passive rule, since otherwise it would leave room for sunspot-driven
real ﬂuctuations. The size of these ﬂuctuations would depend upon the size
of the sunspot shocks (something impossible to quantify in practice), but this
would unambiguously increase the variances of real variables. If such variance
is welfare-damaging, as is almost uniformly believed to be the case and assumed
in the literature, it is clear that such policies would be suboptimal. Our next
task is to characterize some form of ’optimal’ policy rules, when variability of
inﬂation and output gap are costly by assumption.
How does the presence of non-asset holders alter the optimal design of mon-
etary policy rules in the simple IS-AS model with LAMP sketched above? To
keep things simple, we shall only focus on the discretionary, and not fully opti-
mal (commitment) solution to the central banker’s problem. This case can be
argued to be more realistic in practice, as do CGG (1999). There is another
sense in which we cannot treat our solution as an ’optimal’ rule. The objective
function we use is a quadratic loss function in inﬂation and the output gap.
While in the standard case this can be derived as a second-order approximation
to the representative agent’s utility (as is done in Woodford 2003 Ch. 6), this
welfare metric would modify in our case, for there is no representative agent in
the ﬁrst place. However, all our results hold as long as the welfare function is
representable in a quadratic form in output and inﬂation, with a positive weight
on output. We shall henceforth assume that the central bank has the following
















The optimal discretionary rule {ro
t}
∞
0 is found by maximizing this objective
function taking as a constraint the IS-AS system, and re-optimizing every pe-
riod. Note that by usual arguments this equilibrium will be time-consistent.
This is, up to interpretation of the solution, isomorphic to the standard prob-
lem in Clarida et al (1999). Hence, for brevity, we skip solution details available





When inﬂation increases the central bank has to act in order to contract demand,
and expand it in case of deﬂation.
What is the interest rate rule supporting the optimal allocation? Assuming
an AR(1) process for the cost-push shock Etut+1 = ρuut we obtain the following
reduced forms for inﬂation and output from the aggregate supply curve:
πt = α
1




κ2 + α(1 − βρu)
ut17
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Substituting these expressions into the aggregate demand curve, we obtain the
implicit instrument rule consistent with the optimal time consistent equilib-



















π i st h er e s p o n s et oe x p e c t e di n ﬂation in the implicit rule consistent with
optimal policy. Consistent with our previous ﬁnding, the implied instrument
rule for optimal policy changes from active to passive φ
o
π < 1 precisely when
δ changes sign. This result might be more general than it seems: despite the
loss function being assumed ad-hoc, our result would carry over as long as the
welfare function is representable in a quadratic form in inﬂation and output
α(λ)x2
t+i + π2
t+i, with a positive weight on output α(λ) > 0 ∀λ.
Note that the trade-oﬀ of the central bank has not changed, since output
and inﬂation obey the targeting rule 7. Hence, policy needs to conform the same
principle: contract demand when inﬂation increases. But nominal rates have to
be changed such that the real rate decreases if asset markets participation is too
limited. The real rate needs to decrease since a contraction in aggregate demand
is obtained by stimulating demand of asset holders. This happens because part
of aggregate demand (given by the non-asset holders) is insensitive to interest
rate changes, and the intuition is the same as provided before when ruling out
sunspot equilibria with a passive rule. As consumption of non-asset holders
moves one-to one with (and hence overreacts to increases in) the wage, the
other part of aggregate demand becomes oversensitive to interest rate changes
through the channel emphasized above. A decrease in the real rate is optimal,
since otherwise (if the real rate increased) there would be too strong a fall in
consumption of asset holders, violating the optimality condition 7 and actually
leading to an increase in aggregate demand.
Notice that for each estimated policy rule coeﬃcients (such as the ones in
Taylor 1999 and CGG 2000), and given the other deep parameters of the model
, we can track down one weight on output stabilization α which would make the




ˆ φπ − 1
1 − ρu
ρu
In the LAMP economy (δ<0), the implicit weight is increasing in λ and in ˆ φπ:
the more limited is participation, the more the Central Bank has to care about
output stabilization given an observed inﬂation responsiveness ˆ φπ;g i v e naδ,r e -
sponding more to inﬂation means that CB cares more about output gap. When
10A positive policy response to inﬂation requires α ≥− δκ
1−ρu
ρu . This is obviously satisﬁed
in the standard case (δ>0), but not necessarily in the LAMP economy (δ<0) unless the
central bank aims for output stabilization enough.18
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participation is not limited enough to break up the Taylor principle (δ>0),t h e
weights are decreasing in λ and in ˆ φπ:t oh a v es a m ei n ﬂation response ˆ φπ when
participation is more limited, the Central Bank needs to care less about output;
to respond more to inﬂation when all else equal, need to care less about output.
More generally, it can be shown that the implicit weight on output stabilization
is relatively larger in the LAMP economy for reasonable parameter values11.
Hence, even if estimated policy rules were optimal,d i ﬀerence in macroeconomic
performance could be explained by a change in preferences of the FED. This
squares with the general view that the FED was less ’conservative’ in Rogoﬀ’s
1985 sense, i.e. it cared more about output stabilization12 in the pre-Volcker
period (see e.g. Sargent 2002). While this is speciﬁc to the parameterization
considered, the general message it captures carries over to alternatives as long
as we allow for the diﬀerent asset market participation structures. The esti-
mated monetary policy response in the pre-Volcker period may not have been
inconsistent with optimal policy, if the preference for output stabilization was
relatively high.
In summary, we have reviewed theory that indicates the potential desirability
of passive interest rate rules when part of the agents do not participate in asset
markets and do not smooth consumption. There are two reasons why such rules
might be desirable:
1. they rule out potentially welfare-damaging sunspot ﬂuctuations by ensur-
ing equilibrium determinacy.
2. they are the natural result of optimal policy concerned with minimizing
variability of inﬂation and output gap.
If in the 1970s asset markets participation in the US was exceptionally lim-
ited, one can conclude that monetary policy during the period was better than
conventional wisdom dictates. We further provide some evidence for the fore-
going hypothesis on asset market participation, its change and its aggregate
demand implications.
3 S o m ee v i d e n c ef o rt h ec h a n g ei na s s e tm a r k e t s
participation
In this section we present some evidence suggesting that (i) the US economy in
the mid1960’s and 1970s was characterized by lower asset market participation
as compared to the post-1980 period, and (ii) this had the aggregate demand
implications we emphasized above. The change in asset markets participation
is problematic to pin down: there is to our knowledge no empirical study doc-
umenting such a change, let alone that data availability problems abound (e.g.
11E.g. under our baseline parameterizations described below, such implicit weights are 0.437
for the pre-Volcker period and 0.076 for the Volcker-Greenspan era.
12Whether this can be justiﬁed on welfare-maximization grounds is in our view an question
worth of future investigation.19
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Consumer Expenditure Survey data on asset holdings starts only in 1984, the
Survey of Consumer Finances over-samples high-wealth households, etc.). How-
ever, there is institutional information to support such a view; Mishkin (1991)
and references quoted therein provide a comprehensive review of ﬁnancial mar-
ket developments in this period. For a variety of reasons having to do with
excessive regulation, in the ’70s asset holding was limited and most assets held
by small savers were not making interest linked to market interest rates. In
a nutshell, two restrictions were prevalent (i) limits on interest paid by com-
mercial banks to allow S&L to pay slightly more interest (Regulation Q), and
no interest was being paid on checking accounts; (ii) discouragement of other
ﬁnancial market instruments - in 1970 Treasury was convinced to raise mini-
mum denomination on T-bills to 10.000 USD, and bank holding companies and
corporations not to issue small-denominated debt. Hence, small savers were not
making market interest rate, which was well recognized at least by Congress
(and was to trigger a legislative response).
This situation changed in 1980, due both to legislators’ response via deregu-
lation and to markets’ response via ﬁnancial innovation, causes which are some-
times hard to disentangle. On the latter point, Wenninger (1984) and Silber
(1983) list literally hundreds of instruments created by ﬁnancial innovation,
most of them gaining wide usage in the post-1980 period13.O n t h e f o r m e r
point, 1980 saw the adoption of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA)14. Its basic purpose is stated clearly in the
ﬁrst paragraph: "(a) The Congress hereby ﬁnds that: (i) limitations on the in-
terest rates which are payable on deposits and accounts discourage persons from
saving money, create inequities for depositors, impede the ability of depository
institutions to compete for funds, and have not achieved their purpose of provid-
ing an even ﬂow of funds for home mortgage lending; and (2) all depositors, and
particularly those with modest savings, are entitled to receive a market rate of
return on their savings as soon as it is economically feasible for depository insti-
tutions to pay such rate." Among the most important provisions, the DIDMCA
introduced a phaseout of Regulation Q, let Savings&Loans Institutions make
other types of loans and engage in other activities, approved many of the new
instruments mentioned above nationwide, eliminated usury ceilings on mortgage
loans and some business loans and provided uniform access to FED reserve fa-
cilities for all depository institutions. To give just an example (from Mishkin
1991) of the magnitude of the change in ﬁnancial markets: total assets of Money
Market mutual funds increased from 4 billion in 1978 to 230 billion in 1982, and
NOW accounts increased from 27 to 101 billion from 1980 to 1982. The in-
13Among them: a. consumer assets (saver certiﬁcates, money-market MM mutual funds,
ceiling-free MM certiﬁcates, NOW and super-NOW accounts, MM deposit account); b. con-
sumer credit and mortgages (equity access accoutns, secondary mortgage market, ﬂoating-rate
loans, leasing and ﬂexible credits, variable rate mortgages and consumption installment loans);
c. Treasury securities (variable rate bonds, adjustable-rate Fannie MAE, etc.); d. Tax-exempt
securities; e. corporate bonds (deep-discound bonds, zero coupon and variable-rate bonds,
bonds with warrants and IR swaps); f. futures and options on cash market instruments, stock
market indices, etc.
14Followed by the Garn-StGermain Act reinforcing such de-regulatory provisions.20
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troduction and spreading of new ﬁnancial instruments and the elimination of
ceilings on deposit rates (re-)linked saving decisions to market interest rates,
which justiﬁes our assumption about the change in asset market participation
across the two periods. This is further supported by evidence from the 1983
Survey of Consumer Finances data on asset holdings and net worth. Table 8
therein shows that from 1970 to 1983 the percentage of families holding certiﬁ-
cates of deposit changed from 8 to 20, for money market accounts from 0 to 14,
while for other assets such as stocks and bonds the distribution of ownership
is roughly stable15. Table 5 in the Second report shows that the percentage of
families with net worth less than 10.000 USD changed from 56% to 38% (Wolﬀ
and Caner (2002) contains a careful study of asset poverty dynamics). Corrob-
orated with the phasing out of regulation Q such that savings account started
actually making the market interest rate, these arguments complete our justiﬁ-
cation for believing that the US economy before 1980 was marked by relatively
more limited asset markets participation.
One directly testable implication of our model concerns the slope of aggregate
demand. All our results ﬁnally hinge upon the changing slope of the IS curve:
a change in asset market participation would imply that what we call δ has
changed during the Volcker disinﬂation. To our knowledge, there is no study
documenting such a change. Moreover, surprisingly little work has been done
on estimating the ’IS curve’, i.e. an Euler equation for output of the form (2)16.
Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2003) and Fuhrer and Olivei (2004) are to our knowledge
the ﬁrst papers to estimate such equations. In this section, we follow these two
papers closely in what regards data and estimation methods. We build on this
approach to assess the structural stability of the IS curve over the post-1965
period. We shall present evidence that a signiﬁcant change in the sensitivity
of aggregate demand to interest rates occurred in the 1979-1982 period. This
evidence comes from a few sources: (i) estimates over the subsamples 1965-1979
and 1982-200317; (ii) recursive estimations; (iii) test for structural change. We
will follow Fuhrer and Rudebusch in using exactly the same dataset, variables,
and estimation method, although we do not report all the robustness checks due












This form generalizes the simple Euler equation over four dimensions discussed
in detail in Fuhrer and Rudebusch: inﬂuence of lagged terms of the output
gap, ﬂexible timing of expectation formation (τ), inﬂuence of past real rates
(captured by m), and ﬂexible interest rate duration (governed by k). In the
15The holding of bonds and especially stocks became much more widespread especially in
the 1990s - see Guiso, Haliassos and Japelli 2003.
16Whereas a growing literature is concerned with estimating the New Philips Curve - see
the references in Fuhrer and Olivei 2004.
17We exclude the Volcker disinﬂation period when performing sub-sample estimations.21
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ﬁrst set of estimations, we perform robustness checks for diﬀerent measures
of potential output used when calculating output gap: (i) a Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁlter; (ii) a segmented linear trend with one break; (iii) a segmented trend with
two breaks; (iv) a quadratic trend; (v) a segmented quadratic trend; (vi) the
measure of the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO); (vi) one-sided band-pass
ﬁlter (BP2). For most of the remainder of our analysis, we will focus on one
(the most widely used) proxy for the output gap xt, deviations of GDP from
an HP ﬁlter. rt is the quarterly average of the overnight federal funds rate and
inﬂation the annualized log change in the price index18. One issue concerns the
instrument set to be used for estimations: following Fuhrer and Rudebusch and
Fuhrer and Olivei we use four lags of the output gap, federal funds rate and
inﬂation; when checking for robustness, we also use their same set of exogenous
instruments: (four lags of) real defense expenditure, relative oil prices and the
political party of the sitting US President.
For a ﬁrst test, we perform estimations of the ’theoretical IS curve’ (i.e.
a1 = a2 =0 ,k =1 ,m =0such that d corresponds to δ
−1). We estimate
the equation over the two subsamples: the ’Great Inﬂation’ period, 1965:4-
1979:3 and the Volcker-Greenspan period excluding the Volcker disinﬂation,
1983:1-2003:1. Results, reported in Table 1 show estimates of the coeﬃcients
with standard errors, and the p-value from Hansen’s J-test. The estimates
show a possible change in the sign of the interest rate sensitivity of aggregate
demand from a positive value corresponding to our ’LAMP economy’ scenario
to a negative value, consistent with standard theory and policy prescriptions.
At the same time, the coeﬃcient on expected output gap is almost always close
to unity, as expected from theory. The instruments seem to be valid as judged
by the J-test. The results are surprisingly robust to the output gap measure
used, to whether contemporaneous or lagged interest rate is included and to the
instrument set.19
Fuhrer and Rudebusch argue that testing for the simplest version of the IS
curve might be marked by misspeciﬁcation, due to the absence of other poten-
tially relevant dynamic eﬀects such as those embodied in (10) and described
before. They indeed ﬁnd that lagged terms of the output gap and are signiﬁ-
cant economically and statistically, and the coeﬃcient on expected output gap
is signiﬁcantly lower than one. However, their interest rate sensitivity d was
insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for most estimations for the whole sample,
no matter the timing and duration of interest rate used, the output gap mea-
sure or the instrument set. Hence, we also estimate the linear equation (10) by
GMM20 and try to assess the stability of this parameter. The equation we are
18Note that the interest rate used in the estimation is sometimes (when k=4) the four-
quarter moving average.
19Not all permutations are reported in the table, but this result carries over to most of the
possible combinations of interest rate timing, output detrending method and instrument set
used.
20Fuhrer and Rudebusch also perform MLE estimation and show that it performs better
as far as estimation of the forward-looking coeﬃcient is concerned. The two methods lead to22
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now estimating is no longer the same as its theoretical counterpart 2, due to the
presence of lagged terms in output gap (coming in theory from habit persistence
or lags in expenditure decisions) and of diﬀerent timing and duration of interest
rates. Such features, when incorporated into the theoretical model, would most
likely lead to diﬀerent conclusions than our simple framework. Hence, we can
neither attempt to estimate the structural parameters directly, nor map changes
in d to changes in δ
−1 (the theoretical elasticity) directly. However, we believe
that a directional change in the empirical elasticity is informative of the type
of structural change contemplated in the US economy. Results are reported
in Table 2, where for lack of space we only deal with HP-ﬁltered output gap
and endogenous instruments. The sensitivity of aggregate demand to interest
rates (for various timing and duration of the latter) is positive and signiﬁcant,
providing further support for our ’LAMP economy’ scenario.
Next, we perform a set of recursive estimations. For the remainder of
the analysis we shall focus on the richer speciﬁcation (10), using HP-ﬁltered
output gap, endogenous instruments and the interest rate corresponding to
k =4 ,m = −1. First, we report ’increasing sample’ estimates of the d pa-
rameter, i.e. estimates obtained by running the GMM estimation for an initial
sample of 50 observations, and then augmenting the sample by one observation
at each iteration. The results reported in Figure 1 (together with error bands
of two standard errors) show a sharp decrease in the coeﬃcient from a positive
signiﬁcant value to a value close to zero. Hence, we may conclude that the
1965-1979 subsample is very diﬀerent from the rest. To complete the recursive
estimations, we also report rolling estimates in Figure 2, i.e. estimates of d
using a rolling window of 60 observations running from the beginning to the
end of the sample. As expected, there is evidence of instability, with positive
coeﬃcient in the earlier subsamples.
In order to test more rigorously for a structural break in the d coeﬃcient, we
employ the Wald test proposed by Andrews (1993) for GMM estimators. This
test is designed to ﬁnd a structural change when the date of the change is un-
known. The null hypothesis of the test is parameter stability, and is rejected for
large values of the statistic. The statistic is constructed by splitting the sample
into two parts, calculating the coeﬃcients and the corresponding variances and
then moving the threshold towards the end of the sample and repeating the
exercise. A value of the statistic is found at each iteration; the test is a ’sup’
test, so the date with the largest statistic is the date where it is most likely that
the change occurred. Statistical signiﬁcance can be judged using the critical
values calculated by Andrews. Figure 3 reports the Wald statistic for coeﬃcient
d, where we look for the break over the whole sample (excluding the ﬁrst and
last 47 observations). The statistic clearly suggests that there is a change in
the coeﬃcient around quarter 21, which added to the initial 47 observations
similar results as far as the interest rate sensitivity is concerned, hence we stick to the simpler
GMM method.23
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leads to 1981:1 as the suggested break. The other high values of the statistic
are obtained starting from around 1979. This is relatively robust to searches
performed over diﬀerent samples, with diﬀerent timing and duration of the in-
terest rate. The break (as indicated by this test) is always inside the 1979-1982
period.
4 Matching stylized facts
It is an almost consensual view that monetary policymaking changed with
t h ec o m i n gt oo ﬃce of Paul Volcker. One instance of this is a change in esti-
mated coeﬃcients of interest rate rules. CGG (2000), Taylor (1999), Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004) and Cogley and Sargent (2002) all reach such a conclusion.
One is then tempted to attribute (at least part of) the change in dynamics of
macro variables (mainly inﬂation and output) and their variability to such a
change in policy21. Most importantly, since a passive rule leads to an indeter-
minate equilibrium in the models of CGG and Lubik and Schorfheide, these
authors, among others, argue that part of inﬂation variability can be accounted
by sunspot shocks. However, the same authors show that sunspot shocks drive
up both inﬂation and output (this is also the case in our ’LAMP economy’ ,s e e
Bilbiie (2003)). If one wants to ﬁnd an explanation for high inﬂation and reces-
sions (features of the 1965-1980 period) sunspot shocks are not a good candidate.
Fundamental shocks, on the other hand, cannot be studied in an indeterminate
equilibrium as the one with a passive rule in the standard models: they can have
virtually any eﬀects22. But if one assumes that asset markets participation was
limited enough to ensure the ’Inverted Taylor principle’ holds, one can study
the eﬀects of fundamental shocks since equilibrium is determinate23.
We shall look at the responses and moments of macro variables under two dif-
ferent scenarios, using the parametrization described earlier for the pre-Volcker
and Volcker-Greenspan subsamples (notably, unless speciﬁed otherwise we keep
the variances of shocks unchanged across the two periods). We consider the
case whereby there are two parameters changing across the two periods: the
21Many authors have emphasized that increased variability may come from a diﬀerent dis-
tribution from which shocks were drawn in that period - see Sargent 2002 and the studies by
Sims and Bernake and Mihov quoted therein. This is likely to be an important explanation.
But a change in variances of shocks, however, would not generate a change in shapes/signs of
responses to shocks.
22CGG(2000) argue that even variability as explained by cost-push shocks is increased in
a ’near-determinate’ equilibrium, whereby the coeﬃcient on inﬂation is slightly above one.
Hence, this would explain increased variability and higher inﬂation from fundamentals. But
this merely explains why in a determinate equilibrium with an active rule responding less to
inﬂation results in higher variability of the latter. Dynamics in the indeterminate equilibrium
are not pinned down.
23This is an instance of a more general result developed by Beyer and Farmer (2003): for
any given policy regime, one is unable to identify whether the macroeconomic equilibrium was
determinate or indeterminate, since structural models which are observationally equivalent to
either the former or the latter can be constructed. I thank Roger Farmer for pointing out the
larger picture.24
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response of interest rates to inﬂation, and the degree of asset markets partici-
pation. The policy rules are parameterized using estimates by CGG (2000) and
Taylor (1999), namely φπ =0 .8 pre-Volcker and 1.5 for Volcker-Greenspan. The
benchmark share of agents with no assets in the pre-Volcker period is taken to
be the lower bound of the estimates of Campbell and Mankiw 1989, i.e. λ =0 .4,
while for the Volcker-Greenspan period we consider a low value chosen arbitrar-
ily, λ =0 .05. Some robustness checks are performed varying this parameter and
the inverse elasticity of labor supply.
4.1 Cost-push shocks
Arthur Burns emphasized the cost-push nature of inﬂation in the 1970’s time
and again in various speeches and statements as documented e.g. in Hetzel
(1999) and Mayer (1999). Alan Blinder (1982) gives a careful account of the
nature of the shocks and their impact on inﬂation. Mayer (1999) provides addi-
tional references. New research in the sticky-price dynamic general equilibrium
tradition ﬁnds support for the role of cost shocks being the main cause of ﬂuctu-
ations in the pre-Volcker era. Peter Ireland (2004) presents such evidence based
on variance decompositions from a ’new synthesis’ model estimated by maxi-
mum likelihood. A similar result is obtained by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)
using a Bayesian estimation of a ’new synthesis’ model. Our ﬁrst experiment
studies the response of the economy to a unit cost-push shock under the two
scenarios described above. Its purpose is to show that such a shock (even of the
same magnitude) generates relatively much higher and more volatile inﬂation in
the pre-Volcker scenario.
The impulse responses of various variables to a unit cost shock under the
two scenarios are plotted in Figure 4 (circles for ’LAMP economy’ and triangles
otherwise). Indeed, the responses conform to both conventional wisdom and
what we view as a good test for a theory purported to explain dynamics in that
period: higher inﬂation, low real rates, and negative comovement of inﬂation
and the output gap. Moreover, responses of output and inﬂation have the same
sign under both scenarios, as shown analytically in Bilbiie (2003). But the
response of inﬂation is much larger in the pre-Volcker scenario. The response
of output is not much diﬀerent, and the real rate is negative as expected, since
the policy rule is passive. The Wicksellian rate is of course unchanged. Table
3 looks at conditional standard deviations of output gap, inﬂation and interest
rates, normalizing standard deviations in the parameterized Volcker-Greenspan
scenario to 1. The implied standard deviation of inﬂation and interest rates are
much higher for the parameterized pre-Volcker period, conﬁrming conventional
wisdom and empirical ﬁndings, while the standard deviation of the output gap
(and implicitly output) is slightly lower. Note that these results are obtained in
a determinate equilibrium, keeping constant the variance of shocks across the
two periods, and changing only the share of non-asset holders, and the policy
responses.
For a ﬁrst robustness check of this resul t ,w ep e r f o r mt h es a m ee x e r c i s e25
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 408
November 2004
varying the share of non-asset holders. We consider two values for the inverse
elasticity of labor supply, and for each such value we vary λ inside the corre-
sponding interval for each period (i.e., for the pre-Volcker period, λ goes from
just above the threshold making the Inverted Taylor Principle work to a max-
imum value of 0.5; for the Volcker-Greenspan period, it goes from a very low
value to just under the threshold). Results conﬁrm that generally, more con-
ditional volatility (especially in inﬂation and nominal interest rates) results in
the pre-Volcker economy, with a passive policy rule and lower asset markets
participation.
The last robustness check consists of shocking the model with all three
shocks and looking at unconditional volatility for our baseline parameteriza-
tion. First exercise keeps the variance of shocks unchanged across periods.
The second uses the shock standard deviations estimated by Ireland 2004,
namely σa =0 .0104;σu =0 .0035;σε =0 .0033 for the pre-Volcker period and
σa =0 .0089;σu =0 .0002;σε =0 .0028 for the pre-Volcker period24.R e s u l t s
in Table 5 are in line with the previous intuition. Additionally, this last exer-
cise delivers what some authors such as Stock and Watson (2003) have called
a ’Great Moderation’, i.e. a fall in the volatility of output in the post-1980
sample. However, our model is perhaps too simple for this result to be taken
literally.
4.2 Technology shocks
One other dimension along which our model fares well is the eﬀects of technology
shocks for the two sub-periods as documented by Galí, Lopez-Salido and Valles
(2003a) . These authors ﬁnd that in the pre-Volcker era, a positive shock to
technology growth (identiﬁed as having permanent eﬀects using the method of
Galí 1999) was associated with a fall in output below potential and a fall in
inﬂation. We ﬁnd it worth re-emphasizing that such empirical responses cannot
be compared with their theoretical counterpart in the standard models; there,
eﬀects of fundamental shocks cannot be assessed when the policy rule is passive
since equilibrium is indeterminate. But this is possible in our framework. Figure
5 plots the responses of the economy under the pre-Volcker parameterization
(with the persistence of 0.7, same as used by GLV), compared to the benchmark
case of optimal policy whereby the central bank tracks the Wicksellian rate.
The model ﬁts qualitatively the stylized facts mentioned above: both in-
ﬂation and the output gap decrease. The central bank responds to inﬂation
24Ireland estimates a model which is diﬀerent from ours, most importantly (but not only)
because in his model λ =0 . The shock processes’ parameters are model dependent, and using
them in our model may not be the best route. However, note that this is standard practice in
parameterizing general equilibrium models: when one chooses a value for the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, say, one does not estimate it, but rather refers to ’microeconomic
studies’ estimating it via very diﬀerent methods.26
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(and deﬂation) without internalizing the eﬀect on the natural interest rate. The
nominal rate declines since there is deﬂation (and recession), but this response
is suboptimal. Note that the response is not suboptimal because it is too weak
in the sense that the nominal rate does not decrease enough to make real rates
decline! Indeed, that would lead to indeterminacy of equilibrium, which is at
the heart of our Inverted Taylor Principle. Instead, the response is suboptimal
because it has the wrong sign! The optimal response (plotted in the circle lines)
requires nominal rate increases to accommodate the increase in Wicksellian rate
brought about by the positive technology shock. While the responses conform
empirical ﬁndings, it is hard to argue that technology shocks were in fact driving
ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and output gap in that period, since what one wants to
e x p l a i ni sh i g hi n ﬂation coupled with recessions. Moreover, a negative technol-
ogy shock in our model would lead to higher inﬂation, but also to an increase
in the output gap (although both actual and potential output would decrease,
the former decreases by less than the latter). This again is at odds with stylized
facts of the 1970s, and further questions the relative importance of technology
shocks in driving ﬂuctuations in the pre-Volcker period. Indeed, based on vari-
ance decompositions from a DSGE model estimated by maximum likelihood,
Ireland (2004) ﬁnds that technology shocks did not play an important role in
the pre-Volcker era in driving such ﬂuctuations.
4.3 Systematic policy errors
We now brieﬂy investigate the eﬀects of ’honest’ policy errors of a particular
type, related to an argument already put forward by DeLong (1997) and Or-
phanides (2002). These authors argue that the FED was overestimating the
natural rate of output and was keeping real rates too low because it was im-
plicitly underestimating the relative level of actual output, which it seeked to
stabilize. Such policy response can be accommodated in our model, without de-
viating from optimal policy. To see a simple instance of this, consider that the
FED was following what it thought to be optimal policy, but it was overestimat-
ing the natural interest rate (and the natural output) systematically over that
period25. Hence, it was systematically moving the interest rate by changing the
intercept in the policy rule εt more than required, e.g. εt =ˆ r∗
t =1 .1r∗
t (where a
hat means the estimate of the central bank). This case is plotted in Figure 6 in
the graphs with triangles (along with optimal policy without estimation errors
εt =ˆ r∗
t = r∗
t, graphs with circles) .
Overestimating the natural interest rate creates inﬂation, and higher volatil-
ity of inﬂation if compared to optimal rule, but the mechanism is quite diﬀerent
from the usual one; indeed, real rates here increase too much when compared to
optimal policy, which leads to inﬂation by the mechanism stressed throughout
this paper when asset markets participation is limited enough. However, by
25F o rs i m p l i c t y ,a n dj u s tt om a k et h ep o i n t ,w ea s s u m eh e r et h a tt h eF E Dd o e sn o ta c t u a l l y
learn the true process for the natural rate, neither that it is extracting a signal from a noisy
variable. This could be easily accommodated - see Sargent 2002 and references therein.27
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the same mechanism, this would also generate a positive output gap. More-
over, for signiﬁcant departures from optimal policy to obtain, estimation errors
should be quite large. One could conclude that cost-push shocks’ role in driving
ﬂuctuations and output might have indeed been important in the pre-Volcker
era.
The results presented above rely upon a very simple model; we ﬁnd it worth
stressing, however, that they are robust to further complications, and only de-
pend on whether the economy was ever marked by limited enough asset markets
participation. But insofar as this was the case, business cycle ﬂuctuations might
have well not changed during the 80’s because of ’better’ policy. While monetary
policy did change with the coming to oﬃce of Paul Volcker, this might have not
been the cause of the business cycle change (this is argued forcefully by Stock
and Watson (2002, 2003)). What might have changed are structural features
such as the ones emphasized here, leading to more widespread asset markets
participation and hence better consumption smoothing. Information on insti-
tutional changes supports this view, for the years around 1980 were a period
of unprecedented ﬁnancial innovation and deregulation. Policy, instead, might
have been quite well managed even before Volcker, and might have changed
thereafter precisely because of this structural change; for if ﬁnancial frictions
of the type emphasized here were predominant, responding more actively to
inﬂation would have led to great aggregate instability. Greater variability in
macroeconomic aggregates in the 1970’s might result exactly from this struc-
tural change, let alone the most likely change in the distribution of shocks (see
Sargent (2002)).
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The US economy in the 1965-1980 period was characterized by a high degree of
ﬁnancial regulation and limited asset markets participation. One can suggest
that due to this feature pre-Volcker FED policy was better than thought in
two related senses: (i) consistent with a determinate, unique equilibrium, and
hence did not leave room for non-fundamental ﬂuctuations; (ii) close to policy
consistent with minimizing output and inﬂation variability. One is then able to
study the eﬀects of fundamental shocks, which is a notoriously impossible task
when equilibrium is indeterminate.
We explore such a possibility, and provide evidence that (i) the US economy
was subject to such type of frictions over the pre-Volcker era; (ii) sensitivity
of aggregate demand to interest rate had the ’wrong’ sign over the 1965-1980
period, perhaps coming from such ﬁnancial frictions as proposed by the theory
reviewed here. We then ﬁnd that theoretical responses to fundamental shocks
qualitatively conform empirically estimated responses. Notably, we ﬁnd that
cost-push shocks (argued by many others to have been the primary source of
ﬂuctuations in that period) generate considerably higher inﬂation and inﬂation
variability in the pre-Volcker period than they do in the Volcker-Greenspan
for reasonable parameterizations. As to technology shocks, the theoretical re-28
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sponses in the pre-Volcker economy match empirical responses (estimated by
others such as GLV (2003a)), leading to deﬂation and output below potential.
Too inﬂationary a policy in response to technology shocks can result in the
pre-Volcker sample if the central bank overestimates the natural rate of inter-
est, despite following an otherwise optimal policy. This conforms the view of
some authors (e.g. Orphanides 2002) about pre-Volcker policy, but also im-
plies a positive output gap response, something not observed in the data. All
in all, our results may contribute towards a partial explanation of the change
in business cycles based on a change on the structure of the economy (in this
case, developing ﬁnancial markets and hence better consumption smoothing),
rather than ’better policy’. Stock and Watson (2002, 2003) provide empirical
evidence favoring such a view. The change in policy, instead, might represent
an ’optimal’ response to the deregulation of ﬁnancial markets; for optimality
would have indeed required switching from passive to active policy if output
and inﬂation variability and equilibrium uniqueness were of any concern.
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GMM estimates, pre-Volcker
potential output b SE(b) d SE(d) J-test p-val26
HP (m =0 ) 0.85 0.11 0.30 0.10 0.59
HP (m = −1) 1.15 0.09 0.18 0.09 0.71
Quadratic 0.97 0.06 0.33 0.12 0.67
Segmented 1.02 0.07 0.25 0.13 0.65
ST2 1.03 0.05 0.28 0.10 0.82
ST952 1.02 0.05 0.28 0.11 0.81
CBO 1.03 0.05 0.33 0.12 0.74
BP2 1.02 0.05 0.16 0.04 0.55
HP, exog. instr. 0.94 0.08 0.16 0.05 0.86
Quadratic, exog. instr. 0.99 0.04 0.35 0.06 0.97
CBO, exog. instr. 1.04 0.03 0.32 0.06 0.97
ST, exog. instr. 0.99 0.05 0.33 0.06 0.96
ST952, exog. instr. 1.15 0.09 0.17 0.09 0.71
GMM estimates, Volcker-Greenspan
HP, (m =0 ) 1.43 0.10 -0.13 0.04 0.62
HP (m = −1) 1.36 0.09 -0.11 0.04 0.50
Quadratic 0.94 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.34
Segmented 1.07 0.05 -0.09 0.06 0.32
ST2 1.22 0.03 -0.20 0.03 0.65
ST952 1.26 0.03 -0.15 0.03 0.67
CBO 1.18 0.03 -0.08 0.04 0.47
BP2 1.10 0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.25
HP, exog. instr. 0.57 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.85
ST, exog. instr. 1.04 0.04 -0.14 0.04 0.69
ST952, exog. instr. 1.05 0.06 -0.12 0.04 0.72
Table 1: GMM estimation of the theoretical IS curve for two sub-samples.33
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Pre-Volcker
interest rate a1 + a2 b SE(b) d SE(d) J-test p-val.
k =4 ,m=0 0.53 0.35 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.446
k =4 ,m= −1 0.46 0.32 0.11 0.23 0.07 0.489
k =1 ,m=0 0.13 0.89 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.572
k =1 ,m= −1 0.58 0.46 0.08 -0.04 0.083 0.476
Volcker-Greenspan
k =4 ,m=0 0.54 0.53 0.08 -0.015 0.01 0.158
k =4 ,m= −1 0.53 0.52 0.07 -0.014 0.01 0.164
k =1 ,m=0 0.5 0.65 0.10 -0.05 0.01 0.161
k =1 ,m= −1 0.46 0.69 0.11 -0.05 0.01 0.152
Table 2: GMM estimation of the augmented IS curve for two sub-samples.








Table 4: Conditional standard deviations, cost-push shock
Pre-Volcker Volcker-Greenspan
ϕ =5 ,threshold ¯ λ =0 .19
λ =0 .25 λ =0 .5 λ =0 .05 λ =0 .18
σx 1.53 3.61 4.96 5.11
σπ 4.00 6.35 0.86 0.234
σr 1.91 4.574 1.162 0.316
ϕ =3 ,threshold ¯ λ =0 .28
λ =0 .3 λ =0 .5 λ =0 .05 λ =0 .25
σx 7.30 5.86 7.13 7.72
σπ 2.38 4.88 1.37 2.25
σr 1.69 3.51 1.85 3.1434
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Fig. 4: Impulse responses to unit cost push-shock. Line with circles has λ =0 .4 and
φπ =0 .8; line with triangles has λ =0 .05 and φπ =1 .5. Otherwise baseline
parameterization.37
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Fig. 5: Impulse responses to unit shock to technology growth. Estimated rule is with
circles, optimal policy with triangles.38
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Fig. 6: Estimated responses to unit technology growth shock. In the ’circles’
economy, natural rate of interest is systematically overestimated.39
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